The Smyth Report: Administrative and Technical History of the Manhattan Project

The Smyth Report is the "official" U.S. government account of the administrative and technical history of the Manhattan Project. Released six days after "Little Boy" was dropped on Hiroshima, the report's stated goal is to educate the American (and worldwide) public about the principals and capabilities of atomic energy, specifically its military applications:

"The ultimate responsibility for our nation's policy rests on its citizens and they can discharge such responsibilities wisely only if they are informed. The average citizen cannot be expected to understand clearly how an atomic bomb is constructed or how it works but there is in this country a substantial group of engineers and scientists who can understand such things and who can explain the potentialities of atomic bombs to their fellow citizens. The present report is written for this professional group and is a matter-of-fact, general account of work in the USA since 1939 aimed at the production of such bombs."

The report addresses three major areas that I find particularly interesting while occasionally providing a glimpse into the personalities and ideologies of the (mostly non-military) scientists involved with the Manhattan Project. First, its treatment of the science behind the bomb is interesting because it is both accessible and built on first principles. Rarely has such such massive research been undertaken, and the focus on applicability rather than "pure science" is easily apparent throughout the report. Lots of space is dedicated to the tension between scientific principles and industrial capacity. In fact, I was surprised by the set of challenges faced. Drawing a blueprint of an atomic bomb turns out to be fairly easy; learning how to refine the fissionable material, manufacture precision explosives, etc turns out to be the limiting factor. Interestingly, this is still true today; Iran is not limited by its technological understanding but instead by its limited industrial capacity.

The tension between the scientific and manufacturing camps raises the second interesting aspect of the Smyth Report; the administrative history of the Manhattan Project. These section really provide insight into the personalities and group dynamic that were involved. Especially regarding the issue of censorship, the report reveals the complicity (or cooperation) of U.S. scientists:

"This arrangement was very successful in preventing publication and was still nominally in effect, in modified form, in .June 1945 Actually the absorption of most physicists in this country into war work of one sort of another soon reduced the number of papers referred to the committee practically to the vanishing point, It is of interest to note that this whole arrangement was a purely voluntary one; the scientists of the country are to be congratulated on their complete cooperation. It is to be hoped that it will be possible after the war to publish these papers at least in part so that their authors may receive proper professional credit for their contributions."

Another interesting nugget is the developing tension, even then, between American heros and French cheese eating surrender monkeys. In the spring of 1939, Neils Bohr led a coalition of eminent U.S. scientists who voluntarily agreed to cease publishing relevant papers; this arrangement failed, however, due to the refusal of "F. Joliot, France's foremost nuclear physicist, apparently because of the publication of one letter in the Physical Review sent in before all Americans had been brought into the agreement. Consequently publication continued freely for about another year although a few, papers were withheld voluntarily by their authors." In it's discussion of the project's administrative history, the report helps us learn a bit more about some of the leading scientists and military leaders. Their wisdom comes through most clearly in report's summary, however.

In the conclusion, the author exhibits remarkable prescience, accurately predicting several future developments in applied atomic science and articulating ways in which the Manhattan Project fundamentally changed the world. The conclusion is short and dense; I won't summarize because the entire thing is worth reading, but this is the final paragraph of the report:

"Because of the restrictions of military security there has been no chance for the Congress or the people to debate such questions. They have been seriously considered by all concerned and vigorously debated among the scientists, and the conclusions reached have been passed along to the highest authorities. These questions are not technical questions; they are political and social questions, and the answers given to them may affect all mankind for generations. In thinking about them the men on the project have been thinking as citizens of the United States vitally interested in the welfare of the human race. It has been their duty and that of the responsible high government officials who were informed to look beyond the limits of the present war and its weapons to the ultimate implications of these discoveries. This was a heavy responsibility. In a free country like ours, such questions should be debated by the people and decisions must be made by the people through their representatives. This is one reason for the release of this report. It is a semi-technical report which it is hoped men of science in this country can use to help their fellow citizens in reaching wise decisions. The people of the country must be informed if they are to discharge their responsibilities wisely."

More than anything, this leaves me nostalgic for a government I feel like I can trust. This attitude is woefully missing from our government today, which instead reflexively hides anything the least bit controversial. I hope that future administrations will recognize the essential role an active and educated populace plays in creating good government, but frankly, I'm not optimistic.